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Abstract
This article is based on the assumption that theoretical contributions from the 
global South – and in this case, from Africa, do not need to be radically different 
from existing theories to constitute an advancement in terms of engendering 
a better understanding of international relations. Reinterpretations or 
modifications of existing frameworks and the introduction of new concepts 
for understanding are equally important. This is an accepted practice in 
mainstream IR, where existing theories are constantly amended and revisited. 
One need only consider the various incarnations of realist thought.While 
adaptations and conceptual innovations by western scholars are recognised 
as legitimate and adopted into the canon of theory, this is not always the case 
with similar contributions emerging from outside of the West. This article will 
examine three examples of such contributions by African scholars.1The first 
group of scholars reinterpreted the concept of “middle power,” arguing that 
there are specific characteristics that set emerging middle powers like South 
Africa apart from traditional middle powers. The second, Deon Geldenhuys, 
developed the concept “isolated states” and generated a novel analytical 
framework to categorise states based on indicators of isolation. Finally, Thomas 
Tieku draws on the African worldview of ubuntu in calling for the state to be 
reconceptualised in a collectivist, societal way. It is hoped that these examples 
will illustrate that there are theoretical innovations emerging from the Global 
South that can assist us in not only better understanding international relations 
in a particular part of the world, but can in fact provide greater insights into 
the field as a whole.
Keywords: South Africa, middle power, emerging states, ubuntu, homegrown theorizing, 
non-Western IR
1. Introduction
Much has been written in recent years about the western-centric nature of existing International 
Relations (IR) theory, the inapplicability of ‘commonsense’ concepts to the Global South, and 
the need for the field of IR to engage with voices from outside the West. What started off as 
calls coming from the periphery of the field have now penetrated the US-based International 
Studies Association (ISA), reflected in the 2015 annual convention theme: ‘Global IR and 
Karen Smith, PhD, Lecturer, Institute for History, Leiden University, the Netherlands. E-mail: Karen.smith@uct.ac.za.
1 Deon Geldenhuys and the first group of scholars (van der Westhuizen, Nel, Schoeman and Jordaan) are South African, or in 
the case of Taylor, were based in South Africa, while Thomas Tieku is Ghanaian. The choice of scholars is not deliberately skewed 
towards South African scholars, but is based on the work of African scholars with whom I am most familiar. I intend to build on this 
initial attempt at identifying African theoretical contributions by identifying similar work from other parts of Africa.
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Regional Worlds’. This increased interest, no doubt, stems partly from a growing sense of 
anxiety in the West about changes occurring in the international system, linked to the rise of 
new actors whose behaviour and motivations existing theories are not able to make sense of.
These criticisms have also been accompanied by calls for greater inclusion of contributions 
from outside of the West. Unfortunately, these calls have not been met with great success. 
While some journal and book editors and conference organisers are making a concerted 
effort to include the work of scholars from outside of the USA and Europe, many have been 
disillusioned by the lack of response they have received. Relatedly, scholars like Tickner 
and Waever and Tickner and Blaney who set out a decade ago on a project to discover how 
IR is taught, researched and practised in the different parts of the world found, to their 
disappointment, that IR in disperse parts of the world does not seem to be all that different.2 
Is Vale’s comment about the South African IR community – namely that scholars seemed 
to be engaged in ‘an enterprise which, generally speaking, displays little imagination and 
almost no conceptual adventure’3– still applicable, also to other parts of the Global South?
Nkiwane asked whether the situation can be explained on the basis that “Africa has little 
to contribute to IR, or because the power dynamics of the discipline are such that African 
voices are not heard?”4 I have previously argued, in line with other scholars, that the answer 
to this question lies in both. While external factors prevent the expansion of IR knowledge 
to include contributions from the developing world, internal or domestic factors inhibit 
the creation and dissemination of this knowledge. As these have been discussed at length 
elsewhere they will not be revisited here.5 
But is this disappointment really warranted? What is it that we are expecting to emerge 
from the Global South? A new theory to challenge realism? A groundbreaking new way of 
understanding IR that will change the way scholars and policymakers think?
In making the claim that not much innovative theoretical work has come out of the 
Global South, and Africa in particular, one has to be clear about what exactly is meant by 
a theoretical contribution or innovation. This means starting with a definition of theory as 
it applies to IR. In his 1967 article titled “What is a Theory of International Relations?” 
Raymond Aron contended that theory can be two meanings: first, it can be “contemplative 
knowledge… the equivalent of philosophy”.6 Secondly, a theory can be “a hypothetical, 
deductive system consisting of a group of hypotheses whose terms are strictly defined 
and whose relationships between terms (or variables) are most often given a mathematical 
form”.7 Mallavarapu defines theories on the basis of their expectations. According to him, 
theories involve a degree of abstraction, a degree of generalisation, and seek to explain.8 
With regards to advancing IR theory through contributions from outside of the West, the 
debate continues about whether universalist IR theories are at all possible, or whether the 
2 Arlene B. Tickner and Ole Wæver, eds., International Relations Scholarship around the World (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2009); Arlene Tickner and David Blaney, eds., Thinking International Relations Differently (London: Routledge, 2012).
3 Peter Vale, “International Relations in Post-apartheid South Africa: Some Anniversary Questions,” Politikon 31, no. 2 
(November 1, 2004): 240, doi:10.1080/0258934042000280751.
4 Tandeka Nkiwane, “Africa and International Relations: Regional Lessons for a Global Discourse,” International Political 
Science Review 22, no. 3 (2001): 280. 
5 See, for example, Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Why is there no non-Western IR theory? An Introduction,” 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 7, no. 3 (2007): 287-312; Karen Smith, “Obstacles to the Development of IR Theory in 
the Developing World: The Case of South Africa,” Africa Review 2, no. 1 (2010): 65-80.
6 Raymond Aron, “What Is a Theory of International Relations?” Journal of International Affairs 21, no. 2 (1967): 186. 
7 Aron, “What Is a Theory,” 186.
8 Siddharth Mallavarapu, “Theories of International Relations,” in International Relations: Perspectives for the Global South, 
ed. Bhupinder Chimni and Siddharth Mallavarapu (New Delhi: Dorling Kindersley, 2012), 5.
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way forward is to develop regional-specific approaches (for example, the development of 
an IR theory with Chinese characteristics). Cunningham-Cross notes how calls by Chinese 
scholars for greater innovation in Chinese approaches to IR theory, the emphasis has been 
on newness, with innovation meaning “coming up with something that is not only new but 
also distinctive.9 She continues that newness is measured against certain ostensibly western 
markers and originality can only exist where there is evidence of a clear distinction from the 
so-called western theory that preceded it”.10
2. Theoretical Innovation or Not?
Our excitement about the possibilities that exist outside of the West should also be tempered 
by the realisation that ground-breaking theoretical innovations are simply not that common. 
If we allow ourselves to think more generally about theoretical innovation it can, in the 
words of Mittelman mean “creative imagination in the production of new knowledge”.11 
There must be a recognition that there are different levels of theoretical innovation, not 
necessarily to the extent of developing new theory but also through theory and concept 
adaptation. Gill writes, “An innovation introduces something new – a new method, a new 
theory, a new perspective – in ways that have some practical effect on the way that we may 
think about and potentially act in the world”. Importantly, he emphasises that “Often this 
simply involves the act of writing, synthesising, codifying or clarifying ideas current for over 
half a century…or else rearticulating existing Republican arguments in different political 
contexts”.12 Bilgin, drawing on the work of post-colonial scholars like Homi Babha, remains 
tremendously insightful with regard to reminding us that we should not expect to find only 
difference in the non-West. Identifying similarities and instances of mimicry with some 
adaptation – in other words, doing world politics in a ‘seemingly “similar” yet unexpectedly 
“different” way’ can be equally valuable.13 For example, adapting theory to the local context 
through reinterpretations or modifications of existing frameworks - what I have referred to 
as “reinterpreting old stories” in an earlier paper14 and the introduction of new concepts 
for understanding are equally important.  This is an accepted practice in mainstream IR, 
where existing theories are constantly amended and revisited. One need only consider the 
various incarnations of realist thought. While adaptations by western scholars are recognised 
as legitimate and adopted into the canon of theory, this is not always the case with adaptations 
emerging from outside of the West.  For example, Mohammed Ayoob’s notion of what he calls 
“subaltern realism”15 has remained on the fringes of the field and has not been recognised as 
constituting a significant elaboration of realist thinking. Disregarding such contributions as 
not important or radical enough denies agency to scholars who are contributing in ways that 
can enrich our understanding of international relations. South African scholars’ revisiting of 
the notion of “middle power” serves as a case in point.
9 Linsay Cunningham-Cross, “The Innovation Imperative: Chinese International Relations Research and the Search for a 
‘Chinese School’,” (unpublished paper, n.d), 2.
10 Cunningham-Cross, “The Innovation Imperative,” 3.
11 James H. Mittelman, “Rethinking Innovation in International Studies: Global Transformation at the Turn of the Millennium,” 
in Innovation and Transformation in International Studies, ed. S. Gill and J. H. Mittelman (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 249.
12 Stephen Gill, “Transformation and Innovation in the Study of World Order,” in Innovation and Transformation in 
International Studies, ed. Stephen Gill and James H. Mittelman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 9.
13 Pinar Bilgin, “Thinking Past ‘Western’ IR?” Third World Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2008): 6, doi:10.1080/01436590701726392.
14 Karen Smith, “Has Africa Got Anything to Say? African Contributions to the Theoretical Development of International 
Relations,” The Round Table 98, no. 402 (2009): 269-84.
15 Mohamed Ayoob, “Subaltern Realism: International Relations Theory Meets the Third World,” in International Relations 
Theory and the Third World, ed. Stephanie G. Neuman (Houndsmills: Macmillan, 1998), 31-54.
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3. South African Contributions to the Adaptation of the Middle Power Concept
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, a number of South African scholars published articles in 
which they interrogated the “middle power” concept that had become increasingly popular 
as a way to understand South Africa’s foreign policy. They based their work on the existing 
literature on middle powers in IR that had been developed and popularised predominantly 
by scholars like Andrew Cooper and Robert Cox, from another recognised middle power, 
Canada. As the concept – initially reserved for what “traditional middle powers” like Canada, 
Australia, Norway and Sweden – was increasingly being applied to states from like South 
Africa, Brazil and Turkey, it appeared to be losing some of its analytical value. Scholars 
like van der Westhuizen, Nel, Taylor and van der Westhuizen, Schoeman and particularly 
Jordaan subsequently made an important contribution to the literature on middle powers by 
developing the concept through providing greater analytical clarity, and specifically making 
the distinction between traditional and new, emergent or emerging middle powers.16 
While South Africa had been referred to in the literature as both an “emerging power”17 
and “middle power,”18 van der Westhuizen first writes about “South Africa’s emergence as a 
middle power” and Schoeman was the first to explicitly examine the meaning of the concept 
“emerging middle power” in relation to South Africa.19 Nel, Taylor and van der Westhuizen, 
in exploring South Africa’s commitment to multilateralism, highlight what they refer to as a 
“deficiency in the literature to distinguish between traditional or established middle powers 
in the industrialized Western world and emerging middle powers in the South”.20 They set 
out five preliminary suggestions for distinguishing between traditional and emerging middle 
powers. 
Building directly on Cooper and Nel et al, Jordaan sets out to further refine the conceptual 
distinction and to develop a schematic to distinguish between emerging and traditional middle 
powers on the basis of their constitutive and behavioural differences.21 According to Jordaan 
his motivation was to propose an analytical solution to the problems Schoeman and Nel et 
al had come up against in their attempts to distinguish between traditional and emerging 
middle powers.22 While recognising the similarities between middle powers, namely that 
they “conform to the middle power role by their legitimising and stabilising actions that 
enable a smother functioning of the global order”,23 he emphasises that more differences 
exist than is recognised by the existing literature. Under constitutive differences he includes 
democratic tradition, time of emergence as middle powers, position in the world economy, 
domestic distribution of wealth, regional influence, and origins of perceived neutrality. 
Under behavioural differences, regional orientation, attitude to regional integration and 
cooperation, nature of actions to effect deep global change, and purpose of international 
identity construction are listed. For example, with regard to their position in the global 
16 Janis van der Westhuizen, "South Africa's Emergence as a Middle Power," Third World Quarterly 19, no. 3 (1998): 435-55; 
P. Nel, I. Taylor, and J. van der Westhuizen, “Multilateralism in South Africa’s Foreign Policy: The Search for a Critical Rationale,” 
Global Governance 6, no. 1 (2000): 43-60; Maxi Schoeman, “South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power,” African Security Review 
9, no. 3 (2000): 47-58; Eduard Jordaan, “The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing Between 
Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers,” Politikon 30, no. 1 (2003): 165-81.
17 See, for example, Garth Le Pere, “South Africa – an ‘Emerging Power’?” Global Dialogue 3, no.1 (1998): 1-2.
18 Hussein Solomon, “South African Foreign Policy and Middle Power Leadership,” in Fairy Godmother, Hegemon or Partner? 
In Search of a South African Foreign Policy, ed. Hussein Solomon (Halfway House: Institute for Security Studies Monograph Series, 
1997).
19 van der Westhuizen, "South Africa's Emergence”; Schoeman, “South Africa”.
20 Nel, Taylor, and van der Westhuizen, “Multilateralism in South Africa’s Foreign Policy,” 46. (emphasis in original).
21 Jordaan, “The Concept of a Middle Power,” 168.
22 Eduard Jordaan, phone interview by the author, March 15, 2017. 
23 Jordaan, “The Concept of a Middle Power,” 178.
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economy (a constitutive difference), he contended that while traditional middle powers are 
located in the core, emerging middle powers are in the semi-periphery. This has important 
implications for their consequent behaviour and overall foreign policy orientation, with the 
former engaging in legitimising behaviour, while the latter tend towards the reform of global 
economic rules and structures. This reformist tendency, rather than a more fundamental 
transformist approach exhibited by emerging middle powers can be explained by the fact 
that, as semi-peripheral economies, these states still have a competitive advantage over states 
in the periphery, an advantage they do not wish to lose through a large-scale overhaul of the 
system.24 Another significant difference between traditional and emerging middle powers has 
to do with the regional dimension. While the former have little interest in their immediate 
region and regional integration initiatives, the latter have a much stronger regional orientation 
and are often also considered as regional powers. These are important differences in foreign 
policy behaviour that are obscured by reliance on the original concept of ‘middle power’ 
but usefully highlighted by Jordaan’s innovation of distinguishing between “traditional” and 
“emerging” middle powers.
The work of these scholars, and Jordaan’s in particular, is a useful illustration of how an 
existing concept can be adapted in order to make it more applicable to a particular context – 
in his case, understanding the role that South Africa was playing in the world. Significantly, 
however, their modification applies to a much wider group of states that all fit the criteria 
of “emerging middle powers”. Its conceptual value is evidenced by the fact that, despite 
being published in the internationally unknown journal Politikon: South African Journal of 
Political Studies, Jordaan’s article has been cited 187 times, and remains the second most 
viewed and second most cited article published in the journal (Politikon, 2016). This is a 
clear indication of the broader significance of his theoretical innovation. 
4. Geldenhuys’ Conceptual Refinement
In a similar vein, South African scholar Deon Geldenhuys’ work on what he calls “isolated 
states” addresses a gap in the existing IR literature by providing us with analytical tools to 
study states that have been ostracised by the international community. As he notes, the notion 
of isolated states is a peculiar phenomenon in an increasingly interconnected international 
system. In his 1990 book, Geldenhuys emphasises why his work on isolated states is not 
just of importance to an isolated state like South Africa when argues “While South Africa 
may indeed be the world’s foremost ostracised state today, it is not alone in this league. 
Notwithstanding the many unique features of South Africa’s isolation, it is part of a wide 
international problem”.25
He distinguishes between pariah or ostracised states, and those that voluntarily withdraw 
from international relations, in other words externally enforced versus self-imposed isolation. 
He defines isolation as “either a deliberate policy, voluntarily and unilaterally pursued 
by a state over a period of time, of restricting its international interactions and thereby 
withdrawing to a greater or lesser degree from ‘normal’ international relations (self-isolation 
or isolationism) or a deliberate policy pursued by two or more states against another, over a 
period of time, aimed at severing or curtailing the latter’s international interactions against 
its will (enforced isolation)”.26 
24 Jordaan, “The Concept of a Middle Power,” 176.
25 Deon Geldenhuys, Isolated States: A Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 2. 
26 Geldenhuys, Isolated States, 6 (emphasis in original).
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He goes on to develop an analytical framework to measure the extent of a state’s isolation, 
involving a set of thirty indicators that he groups into four areas of isolation, namely: political-
diplomatic, economic, military and socio-cultural. He also cautions that not all 30 indicators 
are of equal importance, and that they should be employed together with various other 
structural and functional considerations. These include the specific target, means, origins, 
objectives, time and results of isolation. He then applies his framework in a comparative 
study focusing on four main case studies, namely China, Israel, Chile and South Africa.
The notion of ostracism or isolation of states remains a highly topical issue. Some states 
who, historically, were the target of ostracism by the western international society but were 
subsequently integrated to a certain extent, find themselves in a familiar situation. Geldenhuys 
notes the examples of Russia in Turkey as historical examples of ostracism which, at the 
time of publication in 1990, “either no longer existis or their current level of isolation is 
generally well below that of Israel, Taiwan, Chile and South Africa. Twenty-seven years later, 
it seems Russia and Turkey would again make for interesting case studies of isolated states. 
Geldenhuys notes how Russia has long been the target of ostracist thinking by Europeans, 
citing the 17th century internationalist theories of the duc de Sully and William Penn, which 
expressed reservations about including Russia in an international organisation.27 Similarly, 
he notes how throughout history, the Ottoman Empire was regarded as a threat to Europe 
and various plans were continuously develop to exclude it from European integration efforts. 
Although his work is largely descriptive, Geldenhuys makes an important contribution 
with regard to refining the conceptual differentiation between terms like isolation, alienation, 
obscurity, seclusion and isolationism. More significantly, however, he provides students of 
IR with an analytical framework by which to measure the international isolation of states.
Although Geldenhuys did not comment on this directly, it is clear that the phenomenon 
of isolation, exclusion, ostracism he studies has direct bearing on recent debates about the 
marginalisation of the non-West in the field of International Relations. In almost all cases, 
states are isolated as a result of not meeting particular criteria – decided by western states - 
that allow for inclusion, acceptance and participation in international society.
In 2004, Geldenhuys published another book on states that are regarded as outcasts by 
the international community. This time, his focus was on “deviant states”. In a similar vein to 
his book on isolated states, his starting point is that the existing terms used in the mainstream 
literature to refer to these states who “behave[d] badly”28 – such as pariah, outcast or 
rogue – were analytically weak as they did not have “a fixed meaning nor any standing in 
international law” and therefore failed to offer “a structure for studying the full spectrum of 
offensive behaviour by states and non-state actors”.29 He then goes on to develop an analytical 
framework of deviance, drawing on sociological theories of deviance to outline three basic 
elements of deviant behaviour, namely social codes, rule breakers and rule defenders. As 
was the case with his isolated states book, he subjects his framework to rigorous empirical 
testing. While Geldenhuys’ theoretical work on isolated states and deviant conduct has been 
cited 148 and 33 times respectively (according to Google Scholar) his seminal book on South 
African foreign policy, The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making 
(1984) has been cited 240 times.30 There are numerous possible explanations – one being that 
27 Geldenhuys, Isolated States, 29.
28 Deon Geldenhuys, Deviant Conduct in World Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 11. 
29 Geldenhuys, Deviant Conduct, 12.




the latter was published 6 and 20 years before his other work. It could also be explained by 
the point made by scholars like Bajpai that in the global distribution of academic labour,31 
scholars in the Global South are often relegated to regional experts whose value lies in their 
capacity to provide empirical data for the application of existing (western) frameworks. It 
is also interesting to note that, when one disaggregates the citations for Isolated States, the 
book is cited mainly by South African scholars or international scholars working on South 
Africa. Perhaps, had Geldenhuys been an American scholar based at a prestigious American 
institution, his work would have had a much greater impact.
5. The Collectivist Worldview: An Ubuntu Alternative to International Relations
Another scholar who makes a significant theoretical contribution in shedding light on the 
foreign policy of African states, Thomas Tieku, not only refines existing frameworks or 
refines concepts, but also incorporates indigenous worldviews into this analysis.32 In an 
attempt to develop an alternative explanation for the behaviour of African states, Tieku draws 
on the idea of African societies as collectivist to develop understandings of, amongst others, 
the African solidarity norm. The notion of an African solidarity norm, which discourages 
African leaders from disagreeing with each other in public and from defying continental 
consensus on issues was referred to by scholars such as Mazrui and Clapham.33
In an effort to explain the motivations for this behaviour, Tieku, a Ghanaian scholar, 
bases his argument on the notion that the predominantly individualist ontology employed by 
scholars of international relations fails to incorporate practices based on a more collectivist 
understanding, such as consensual decision-making.34 He highlights some of the problems 
with an individualist approach, one of which is that it neglects group identity. This is in 
contrast to collectivist societies, where group membership and obligations are paramount.35 
When these assumptions are transferred to the state, we can only understand the state as 
an independent, egotistical actor that, he argues, results in a limited understanding of state 
behaviour. Specifically, he argues that the individualist ontology prevalent in Western IR “has 
undermined our understanding of the international politics of collectivist social entities such 
as those in Africa”.36 
A collectivist understanding of Africa’s international relations is manifested in the 
perspective of ubuntu. It can be regarded as an indigenous worldview, common to southern 
African societies, and found in different forms across the rest of the African continent. 
While the term ubuntu comes from the Nguni language family, variants of it exist in many 
sub-Saharan African languages. It is difficult to translate into English, with “collective 
personhood” being the most direct translation. It refers to the idea that 
[The individual] owes his existence to other people…He is simply part of the whole…
Whatever happens to the individual happens to the whole group, and whatever happens to 
the whole group happens to the individual [...].37 
31 Kanti Bajpai,“Obstacles to Good Work in Indian International Relations,” International Studies 46, no. 1-2 (2009): 109-28.
32 Thomas Kwasi Tieku, “Collectivist Worldview: Its Challenge to International Relations,” in Africa and International 
Relations in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Fantu Cheru, Timothy Shaw, and Scarlett Cornelissen (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012), 36-50.
33 Ali A. Mazrui, “On the Concept of “We are all Africans,” American Political Science Review 57, no. 1 (1963): 88-97; Ali 
Mazrui, Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition (London: Wakefield & Nicolson, 1967); Christopher Clapham, 
Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
34 Tieku, “Collectivist Worldview,” 37. 
35 Tieku, “Collectivist Worldview,” 41.
36 Tieku, “Collectivist Worldview,” 41.
37 Mbiti, 108-9, quoted in Rob Gaylard, “Welcome to the World of Our Humanity”: (African) Humanism, ubuntu and Black 
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While much has been written about ubuntu, particularly with reference to conflict 
resolution, peacebuilding and human rights,38 it remains on the fringes of scholarly analysis 
in IR. Scholars of South Africa’s foreign policy have had to take note of it after the term 
appeared in the title of the country’s 2011 foreign policy white paper: “Building a better 
world: the diplomacy of ubuntu”.39 As discussed in previous work,40 the concept of ubuntu 
may help us to understand how both states and non-state actors in Southern African relate to 
one another.  
It is important to point out an important caveat in employing this term as representative of 
African communities: in light of the apparent disconnect between this concept and much of 
what is currently occurring on the African continent, it is often dismissed as utopian and not 
reflective of reality. However, while the principles underlying ubuntu are undoubtedly under 
tremendous pressure throughout Africa, as a result of urbanisation, conflict, and so forth, this 
does not invalidate its potential to contribute to our understanding of IR. 
In applying a collectivist understanding to Africa’s international relations, Tieku argues 
that this has important implications for thinking about concepts like national interest. If the 
state does not primarily see itself as an independent actor pursuing its own narrow interests, 
seemingly irrational behaviour by African states can more easily be understood. He describes 
three features arising from a more collectivist approach, namely consensual decision-making, 
group-think and the Pan-African solidarity norm.41 Consensus-based decision-making is 
encapsulated in former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere’s statement, “We talk until we 
agree”.42 In practice, this means that decisions by the African Union’s Peace and Security 
Council about whether or not to intervene in a conflict on the continent has to be reached 
through consensus. 
Tieku regards the latter as “a widespread belief among African ruling elites that the proper 
and ethically acceptable behaviour of Africa’s political elites is to demonstrated a feeling 
of oneness and support towards other African leaders, at least in public”.43 He highlights 
the practical implications of continued adherence to this norm, which include that decisions 
to intervene are made on the basis of consensus, there is a strong preference for soft tools, 
and that AU members are not allowed to criticise offending states in public.44 This sheds 
light on African states’ show of solidarity with Sudanese President al-Bashir – which 
involves their refusal to arrest him despite calls by the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
Attempts by the African Union to engage Muammar Gaddafi in a negotiated solution before 
the UN decision to authorise NATO airstrikes is another illustration. Former South African 
president Thabo Mbeki’s handling of the crisis in Zimbabwe also remains a relevant case 
in point. He consistently deployed so-called “quiet diplomacy”, and – despite significant 
international pressure to the contrary – remained unwilling to publicly criticize the Mugabe 
South African Writing,” Journal of Literary Studies 20, no. 3-4 (2004): 268-69.
38 See, for example, Tim Murithi, “A Local Response to the Global Human Rights Standard: The ‘Ubuntu’ Perspective on 
Human Dignity,” Globalization, Societies and Education 5, no. 3 (2007): 277-86.
39 While the term appears in the title of the foreign policy document, nowhere in the text is a definition provided of what exactly 
is meant by it. 
40 Karen Smith, “Contrived Boundaries, Kinship and Ubuntu: A (South) African View of the ‘International’,” in Thinking 
International Relations Differently, ed. A. Tickner and D. Blaney (London: Routledge, 2012), 301-21.
41 The notion of the Pan-African solidarity norms builds on work by Clapham (1996) and Mazrui (1963, 1967).
42 Quoted in Heinz Kimmerle, “Ubuntu and Communalism in African Philosophy and Art,” Rozenberg Quarterly, September 
2011, accessed August 10, 2016, http://rozenbergquarterly.com/ubuntu-and-communalism-in-african-philosophy-and-art/, 3.
43 Thomas Kwasi Tieku, “Solidarity Intervention: Emerging Trends in AU’s Interventions in African Crisis” (speaking notes for 
the workshop on Africa International: Agency and Interdependency in a Changing World, Chatham House, London, UK, October 9, 
2009), 3.
44 Tieku, “Solidarity Intervention,” 4.
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regime’s human rights abuses. Whilst, from a western, individualist understanding, these 
public displays of solidarity by African states seem somewhat irrational, if approached from a 
collectivist worldview, they make much more sense. The preference for negotiated solutions 
to conflict and refusal to condemn human rights abuses by other African states is very much 
in line with notions of African collectivism. Tieku contends that understanding this can 
assist the rest of the international community in responding appropriately to African states. 
Importantly, however, he also emphasises that the collectivist ideas and practices he outlines 
are not only found in Africa.45 This is significant, in that what he calls “[t]heir omission from 
the analytical tools of IR” has not only impoverished our understanding of the behaviour of 
African states, but of IR in general.46
The incorporation of the concept ‘ubuntu’ could also potentially offer an alternative 
explanation for why multilateralism seems to be African states’ preferred strategy. Usually 
explained on the basis of pragmatic considerations of strength in numbers, it may also 
be partly due to an inherent adherence to collectivist principles and an acceptance of the 
inevitable need to cooperate with other, and to find solutions through collective practices. 
This is evident in traditional conflict resolution practices from southern Africa, as outlined 
by Murithi, who argues that incorporating ubuntu into our understanding of human rights 
places “more of an emphasis on the obligations that we have towards the ‘other’ because of 
our ‘interconnectedness’.47 
While his work on the African Union is frequently cited, his chapter on a collectivist 
worldview (published in 2012) has only been cited six times. This could partly be due to the 
fact that it was published as a book chapter, but may also tell us something about the interest 
in such alternative understandings of international relations.
In addition, besides its potential explanatory value, the concept of ubuntu can also help 
refocus attention in IR towards important principles such as shared humanity, given that it 
places emphasis on cooperation, mutual understanding and a greater sense of responsibility 
towards a collective well-being.48 This is arguably one of the major shortcomings of the 
field of IR as it is currently practiced:  that it has become virtually devoid of all concern 
with humanity, and that the apparent gulf between what scholars are spending their time 
researching and challenge faced by the majority of the world’s people are increasingly further 
removed.
6. Conclusion
This paper has tried to move beyond the now widely accepted criticism that existing IR 
theories are inadequate in understanding the full diversity of international relations, and fail 
in particular when trying to explain dynamics in the Global South. In exploring potential 
theoretical contributions from Africa, it has also tried to avoid being hamstrung by grand 
ambitions of innovative theorising and a perpetual search for difference. Instead, the contention 
is that even seemingly minor adaptations of existing concepts or frameworks constitute 
significant contributions to the development of the field of IR. Despite the obvious value 
of these contributions, the issue of recognition remains a challenge. Ironically, it is not just 
gatekeepers in the core that do not recognise adaptations as making significant contributions. 
45 Tieku, “Collectivist Worldview,” 49.
46 Tieku, “Collectivist Worldview,” 49.
47 Murithi, “A Local Response,” 284.
48 D.M. Swanson, “Ubuntu: An African Contribution to (Re)search for/with a ‘Humble Togetherness’,” Journal of 
Contemporary Issues in Education 2, no. 2 (2007): 65.
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Commentators in the Global South, too, disregard adaptation as and inferior practice as it 
still uses existing knowledge as its foundation, thus legitimising what is regarded by many 
as illegitimate forms of knowledge imposed on the developing world through colonialism.
In addition, drawing on indigenous concepts like ubuntu can help to explain not only the 
behaviour of African states, but in shifting our focus from an individualist to a collectivist 
ontology, can illuminate the dynamics at play in global governance more broadly. After all, 
an important motivation for exploring African and other non-Western readings of existing IR 
concepts is to gain new insights that can enrich our understanding of international relations 
in general.  
Having considered some of the advantages of non-western theorising, it is only appropriate 
to also point out the potential pitfalls. Perhaps the most dangerous is the tendency towards 
nativism, the assumption that what is, for example, African or Asian or from the Global 
South, is necessarily superior, different, closer to the truth, or more radical than western 
knowledge. 
Recent calls for decolonising knowledge – while founded on legitimate concerns about 
what are perceived as continuing reliance on western or colonial authors and ways of thinking 
about the world – have in some cases also been accompanied by a call for the rejection of all 
existing western knowledge.  Such demands are in stark contrast the argument made in this 
paper, namely that knowledge creation can and should not be an isolated endeavour but that 
building on existing knowledge is essential to the broader project. By rejecting these calls, 
the claim is not that the western canon does not suffer from severe shortcomings. It also does 
not imply that much of western scholarship is not biased, shortsighted and simply illegitimate 
in its assumptions of universality. We cannot claim this, however, if we do not engage with 
it, in all its plurality, and draw our own conclusions.
This approach is also reflected in renewed calls by some South African students to 
‘decolonise’ or ‘Africanise’ the knowledge that they are exposed to at universities. The 
insistence on Africanist approaches is itself founded on dangerous notions of nativism and 
exclusivity that assume that African knowledge is necessarily superior, different, or more 
radical than western knowledge. These calls for a radical purging of colonial / Western influence 
are arguably impossible to achieve in practice, given the interconnected nature of knowledge 
in a globalised world. Bilgin and others have highlighted the ways in which knowledge 
sharing has always been an interactive process, and the difficulties in determining what is 
western, colonial, imported knowledge versus what is truly autochtonous.49 Acknowledging 
the influence that colonial practices have had in imposing certain forms of knowledge does 
not mean that we should not also acknowledge the fact that knowledge has never travelled 
exclusively in a uni-directional manner. Knowledge creation and dissemination has occurred 
through imposition, but also through mutual exchange – whether deliberate or not, in parallel, 
in contestation, and in mimicry.
One of the leading figures of African postcolonialist thinking, Frantz Fanon, was heavily 
influenced by a diversity of thinkers – most of them western. This, of course, does not mean 
that Fanon uncritically internalised these ideas and made them his own. Instead, he used them 
to develop his own thoughts, adopting, adapting, criticizing and discarding them as he saw 
fit. While entirely novel theoretical innovations from the Global South should of course be 
49 Bilgin, “Thinking Past ‘Western’ IR?”.
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encouraged, that should not be the sole focus of those looking beyond the West for new ways 
to understand international relations. Such a narrow focus would run the risk of overlooking 
much of the important work that is being, and has already been, done. The work of scholars 
such as those introduced in this article clearly constitute and should be recognised as valuable 
theoretical contributions, and serve to disprove the claim that little innovative theoretical 
work is being done outside of Europe and North America. 
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